have significant consequences for the firms, cities, counties, and states that sponsor the plans. Indeed, managing the intersection of pension assets and liabilities, which is ultimately the responsibility of the pension-fund governing structure, has become one of the most pressing issues facing public and private plan sponsors today (Clark and Monk, 2007a) .
Pension-plan governance, which refers to the oversight, accountability, transparency, and decision-making norms underpinning the operations and investments of a pension plan, is thus an issue of vital concern and global significance. The Chartered Financial Analysts Institute recently concluded that:``The conduct of those who govern pension schemes significantly impacts the lives of millions of people around the world'' (The CFA Institute, 2007 , page 1). However, despite its clear importance, there appear to be significant governance problems in many pension plans (see Ambachtsheer, 2007a; 2007b; Clark and Urwin, 2008) . Indeed, many are sceptical that current pension governance mechanisms can meet the challenges of modern financial and political environments. This is an important finding for all those concerned with pension-plan investments, accountability, transparency, and beneficiary welfare. However, it also carries specific importance for geography. As pension governance shapes the geography of finance by directing where pension capital flows, it dictates how pension assets are put to use in different places and spaces and impacts the financial resources of sponsoring firms and public entities. So, in sum, if governance is inadequate, it can trigger a redirection and redeployment of assets as well as increases in the financial burden for sponsors.
In previous works, I and my colleagues have focused on analyzing and conceptualizing the shortcomings of DB pension plans in the private sector, illustrating the various forces that engendered the current DB pension problems (see Clark and Monk, 2007a; 2008; Monk, 2008a) . While recognizing the acute stress felt by US private sector sponsors in the early years of this decade, this has left public pension governance and its interaction with plan assets and liabilities undertheorized. (1) As such, I will use the public case to make my arguments, building on the constructive agenda for change that is building within academia (see Ambachtsheer, 2007a; Clark and Urwin, 2008) . Moreover, while the focus of this paper is on the US, Monk (2008b) shows that many of my findings also hold for the case of Japan and beyond. Finally, I recognize that numerous factors have contributed to the problems faced by DB pensions, such as population aging, accounting rules, actuarial best practice, regulatory changes, and wage inflation (see Clark and Monk, 2007a; Monk, 2008a) . Nevertheless, the focus of this paper remains on the governance system; as the guiding force behind pension plans, it is ultimately responsible for managing the factors cited above and is thus partially responsible for their negative impact.
With this in mind, I have two objectives. First, I test the capacities of the current pension governance system, focusing on two typical types of governance failures and evaluating the role of plan sponsor in managing these failures. Second, I situate pension governance, both good and bad forms, within the realm of economic geography. This is done through a multimethod approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998 ) that refers to: (1) publicly available research and reports; (2) two case studies developed through close dialogue; and (3) the findings of a survey that produced over 1250 US (1) Public pensions both are at the forefront of implementing highly effective governance mechanisms and have been the victims of high-profile governance failures. Even so, I show that public pension-fund trustees are highly confident about their current governance systems, despite opposing views by other stakeholders. As Barber and Odean (1999) argue, overconfidence is typical of all financial actors, but the relative overconfidence of public trustees, vis-a© -vis their private counterparts, adds to the importance of better understanding of public sector plans. expert responses on issues relating to pension-plan governance. As argued below, this type of survey provides a useful proxy for actual evidence, as the experts are being surveyed on topics directly within their domain of expertise. As such, I use the survey data to underscore the deficiencies in the current governance system. Using case studies, I will then demonstrate how pension plan governance affects global economic geography. Owing to certain data limitations, I do not establish empirical correlations between governance and geography through regression analysis (cf Mitchell and Hsin, 1994) . Instead, I make linkages through case analysis and expert opinion, both accepted tools in the social sciences (see below). Indeed, I argue that geographical studies of financial markets and actors require the combined insights of close dialogue (Clark, 1998 ) and large-scale data analysis; this is precisely the methodology adopted.
The plan for this paper is as follows: in section 2 I underscore the significance of public pension funds for state government finances. Next, in section 3 I develop the theoretical arguments underpinning the importance of pension-fund governance. In section 4 I test the current governance model's capacities. This is done through a survey of US pension experts. In short, the survey finds a tangible scepticism about pension-fund governance. Subsequently, in section 5 I illustrate how poor pension governance affects economic geography. This is done through two illustrative case studies of high-profile governance failures. In section 6 I conclude that, while many current governance models remain inadequate, a finding that foreshadows ongoing governance breakdowns with implications for welfare and geography, changing will be slow due to entrenched stakeholder interests and the embedded nature of the inherited institution.
The geography of US public pensions
Geographers have been quick to point out the global impact of pension investment policies (Clark, 2000) . However, pension-plan liabilities are also having dramatic impacts on plan sponsors. According to the 2005 Public Fund Survey, which is made up of 88% of all local and state retirement systems, public pensions were only 86% funded, which means that there is a US$300 billion gap, at least, between plan assets and liabilities. Moreover, this underfunding is typically concentrated in certain severely impacted plans. For example, among the fifteen worst performing plans (see table 1), the gap between assets and liabilities was over US$100 billion. (2) Remarkably, some have argued that even these numbers are not high enough: if US public pensions were forced to abide by the same reporting standards as the private sector, nationwide underfunding could be as high as US$800 billion (Walsh, 2006) . This public pension funding gap comes at an increasingly difficult time for states, as their preexisting financial demands have been growing more rapidly than their revenues, compounding an already serious fiscal problem for governments. According to the Council of State Governments (2003) ,``the states are in dire fiscal straits'' (page 1). This fiscal`crisis' is already having profound geographic repercussions, as summarized by Behn and Keating (2005) :`D espite billions in new revenue, California, for example, has proposed a wide array of spending freezes and cuts in after-school programs. In Ohio, the legislature is debating large spending reductions for cities, counties, and libraries. Nebraska is cutting corrections and human services, while tapping reserves to avoid greater cuts. Missouri has proposed large layoffs in mental health, parks, and other programs. Pennsylvania is eyeing fare increases and services reductions for mass transit'' (page 1).
(2) For a detailed breakdown of the geographic dispersion of public pension underfunding among US states, see the Public Fund Survey (http://www.publicfundsurvey.org).
While spending on programs such as education and health have placed considerable pressure on state budgets, providing and replacing infrastructure is also a growing problem. According to the US Department of Transportation, the cost to repair all roads and bridges nationwide is estimated to be US$460 billion and is largely a local and state government problem (Malanga, 2007) . So, pension funding deficits clearly come at a precarious time, compounding an already serious fiscal situation. (3) Local and state governments faced with these financial problems have few options with respect to their growing pension problems: they can issue pension obligation bonds, in effect taking the current pension liability and passing it on to future generations of taxpayers. (This represents a significant failure of political organizations to deal with the problem in the present.) They can increase contributions levels. They can cut government services or raise taxes, both unpalatable politically. Or, they can try to cut benefits, though this is frequently illegal. In the past, state and local governments have even underfunded their pensions to free up space in budgets (Romano, 1993) , but considering the issues under consideration in this paper, this also seems an unlikely solution. In short, public finances around the country are in a difficult position, and pension funding with its related retiree health costs are making these existing problems worse.
Consider the case of Lockport, New York. Home of Delphi Corporation, its citizens have witnessed how DB pension liabilities can impair plan sponsors in both the public and private sectors. In 2005 Delphi filed for bankruptcy citing overly burdensome pension costs (see Monk, 2008a) . Unfortunately for Lockport, in addition to the impact that pension liabilities can have on firms, it provides an example of what DB pension liabilities can do to public finances. The city is being``consumed by the (3) In the case of public infrastructure projects, pension funds are simultaneously the source of the problem, as public entities are forced to divert money that might have been invested in infrastructure into pension plans, and the potential solution, as pension investment strategies are increasingly looking to private investments in infrastructure. Indeed, pensions view the long-term investments in infrastructure projects as being a good match for their long-term liabilities.
kind of pension and retiree health care costs that helped push Delphi into bankruptcy'' (Hakim, 2006) . Indeed, the city's pension costs have risen tenfold in the past decade, and its credit ratings have been cut. Lockport is joined by many other public entities in being financially constrained by growing pension costs. Throughout the US, poor pension-plan governance and growing pension liabilities are hampering public finances. Below are three cases that underscore the importance of the pension liability for US cities and states:
. After serious governance failures for the San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, the pension system's funding status dropped to under 70%, with an unfunded liability of nearly US$1.5 billion. As a result, the city can ill afford to build and maintain local infrastructure due to the need to fill the gap between assets and liabilities with contributions. The city has``fallen behind on its maintenance of streets, storm drains and public buildings'' (Walsh, 2006) . This case exposed the severe (government-wide) fiscal consequences of poor pension-fund governance. . In New Jersey, governance breakdowns have led to severe underfunding of the state pension fund for teachers (and a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation), putting a serious fiscal strain on the state (Walsh, 2007) . Governor Corzine has indicated that fulfilling his election promise of lowering property taxes is now practically impossible, and he has proposed leasing the New Jersey Turnpike to private partners to fill the gap (a prospect of some significance for the development of the private market for infrastructure funding; see Torrance, 2007) . . In Massachusetts, poor pension-plan governance has put in play the very autonomy of local governments. The recently signed Municipal Partnership Act (4) will require underperforming municipal, county, and other independent entities' pension systems to be passed over to the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Trust (PRIT) Board. The bill calls for the state seizure of all funds whose average annual rate of return was 2% less than PRIT over the past ten years. As Frug (1980) noted some time ago,``there is a widespread belief that although cities are supposed to protect the public interest, they cannot really be trusted to do so'' (page 1067). Indeed, since state governments are ultimately responsible for city liabilities, this bill is designed to thwart a future state bailout of poorly governed local pension plans through the effective management of the assets and liabilities at the state level [see Hagerman et al (2006) on the structure and performance of Massachusetts PRIT].
As the above highlights, large unfunded pension liabilities stemming from governance breakdowns have had a significant impact on US state government finances. This has resulted iǹ`s kyrocketing tax increases and the loss of public services ... from the shutdown of libraries and community centres to the gutting of many local police and fire departments'' (Revell, et al, 2004 ). As such, pension-plan assets and liabilities, and the mechanisms that govern them, are very important for understanding contemporary constraints on US city and state economies.
3 Pension-plan governance The governance of pension plans refers to the pension-fund board, its structure, and the rules and procedures overseeing the allocation, distribution, and investment of fund assets. Fundamentally, good governance requires a sound investment policy, (4) See http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=gov3pressrelease&L-1&LO=Home&sid=Agov3&b=pressrelease &f=070725 gov signs mpa&csid=Agov3 and a sound investment policy relies on a well-structured decision process (Leibowitz, 2005) . Moreover, governance must provide pension boards with the tools and capacities to, for example, protect against political influence, stem fraud and corruption, maintain accountability and transparency, manage new and existing financial risks, and supervise new and existing economic actors and stakeholders. Moreover, it must do all this while maintaining exclusive focus on beneficiary welfare. In sum, it considers all factors affecting the health of the plan, as it is the guiding force behind the plan's trajectory.
If governance is efficient and transparent, new investment classes that carry more risk and require higher financial literacy, such as investments in alternative assets or emerging markets, are more easily incorporated into investment portfolios, bringing money to underserved markets and potentially higher returns. However, if pensionplan governance is inadequate, plans may be forced to retreat into highly standardized investment classes that are easily monitored and evaluated, such as government bonds. These investment classes offer a lower risk-adjusted rate of return and thus increase the pension cost for the sponsors, as pension funding is directly related to investment returns and sponsor contributions. It is based on these changing`flows' and`pools', and how these changes impact beneficiary and sponsor welfare, that I make the claim that pension-plan governance is an increasingly important player, though perhaps underappreciated, in economic geography; its conceptualization, design, and implementation carries significant consequences for capital markets and effective liability management. However, unlike corporate governance, which has an abundant literature dedicated to conceptualizing and plotting best-practice solutions for organizational deficiencies, the governance of pension funds has attracted scant attention within the social sciences [see Ambachtsheer (2007a) and Clark et al (2006; as rare examples]. This gap within the literature is remarkable: if global finance is the engine at the heart of a new and constantly changing economic geography, then pension plans are its primary vehicle and pension-plan governance is its chauffeur.
Pension funds are inherited institutions; their original design is a remnant of a past era. The 19th-century design of pension plans awarded significant importance to an ideal of``political representation with expertise'' (Clark, 2007) . As such, pension-fund governance, through to today, is as much a political matter as it is about financial management. However, 21st-century financial imperatives challenge the capacity of this type of governance institution to cope with the modern political and financial environment. Indeed, there is a serious tension today between`representation' and financial expertise' on pension-fund boards. (5) As Clark (2007) indicates,``As the nature and scope of financial markets have grown, expertise has gone well beyond common sense'' (page 7). The implication is that`representative' board members may actually lack the necessary skills to fulfil the roles assigned them because they were not selected based on their expertise. As Skypala (2007) argues,``The root of the problem must lie in the skills, or lack thereof, of the people running the money'' (page 6), as changes in the investment landscape have made life very difficult for amateur trustees.
As such, the educational background and skill of the trustees themselves have become the subjects of academic research. Clark et al (2006; demonstrate that trustees do not demonstrate a capacity to be competent and consistent in financial decision making. Also, Lerner et al (2007) revealed the financial damage that representative requirements can create, illustrating a case in which trustees who have invested time and resources to become financially literate are rotated off of the trustee (5) However, as Clark (2007) demonstrates, if governance systems are structured properly, these conflicting demands can be reconciled. Of real concern, then, is not the root of the current system, but its implementation.
board to make way for new, oftentimes knowledge-poor, representative appointees. Of particular interest also is the composition of the plan boards. Remarkably, pension-fund boards throughout the US are extremely heterogeneous, a point best illustrated by Useem and Mitchell (2000) :`T o illustrate diversity of governance structures, some pension plans are overseen by elected officials, while others are managed by self-perpetuating boards. Some have elaborate rules governing investments and evaluating performance, while others have few fixed policies. Some prefer equities over fixed income, others favour indexing, and still others are drawn to the global marketplace. Some emphasize long-term holdings, but others opt for tactical shifting'' (page 1). Table 2 further demonstrates this mix of types, highlighting the lack of consensus as to what constitutes`best practice' in pension-plan governance. Elected`representative' officials comprise a significant portion of board seats for some plans, while others have none. Where appointees exist, it is also not clear that they are selected according to financial competencies. In New York and Oregon, appointees are in fact required to have a high level of financial literacy. However, it appears that appointees in Georgia are selected based on their representative backgrounds. These differences engender variable investment performances. As Useem and Mitchell conclude,`g overnance policies do influence investment strategies, and investment strategies in turn shape financial performance'' (page 502). As such, pension-fund governance is inextricably linked with investment performance, with bad governance associated with substandard financial returns. Moreover, owing to the power of compounding, any gain or loss stemming from bad governance is magnified over time until the governance system changes. This is a noteworthy assessment of those tasked with safeguarding the retirement of millions of people and maintaining sponsor contributions at levels that do not overly burden financial resources. All this suggests that how one governs DB pension plans makes a big difference for the intersection of pension assets and liabilities. 
Testing pension governance: a global survey of expert opinion
In this section I map the views of an elite group of pension experts on issues explicitly related to the governance of pension plans. The purpose of doing this survey is threefold: (1) to test the capacities of the current governance model to stand up to two specific types of governance failures that have plagued pensions in the past (see section 5); (2) to test the relevance of pension governance as an issue of concern for US experts; and (3) to evaluate how competing pension stakeholders view the governance system and the responsibility of the sponsors therein. In sum, this survey attempts to problematize and conceptualize the geography of pension-plan governance through data-led observations.
Survey set-up
With media and government attention of the governance failures associated with thè pension crisis' reaching its zenith in the spring of 2006, an expert seminar was convened in Oxford. Over fifty pension experts from six countries participated in a pension summit that gave voice to each stakeholder group in an open forum. As part of this seminar, a pilot opinion survey, designed to expose expert opinion on a number of contentious issues, was prepared and distributed. The survey consisted of questions grouped into seven core subject areas, one of which was`governance'.
Respondents were asked to identify themselves in terms of geography and stakeholder affiliation. The result was a fascinating global map of expert opinion. Based on the success of the pilot, a full-scale global survey was undertaken by me and my colleagues at the University of Oxford. With the help of Pensions and Investments, the online survey was launched in January, 2007 and remained open for four weeks. (6) In total, the surveys produced 1266 US responses. The respondents had a weighted average experience of fifteen years working explicitly on pension-related issues, suggesting the goal of reaching out to`pension experts' was attained. In terms of organizational allegiance, there were more than 100 responses from academics, corporate pension trustees, money management firm employees, trustees of public pension plans, and government regulators. To my knowledge, no other survey has canvassed individuals with this unique cross-section of geographies, experiences, and backgrounds on these issues. (7) Nevertheless, this type of survey requires certain methodological and logistical clarifications. First, in terms of logistics, since this was an online survey it required specific tools to ensure its credibility. It was launched with a format designed to stop routine`form filling'. This was achieved in a number of ways including ensuring that the order of questions did not cue responses from one question to the next. As well, the format of the survey included disjunctures between questions that forced respondents to work through the sequence of options. Finally, as respondents finished the survey, the results were automatically compiled and sent to a central electronic collection point.
Second, in terms of methodology, while opinions are not equivalent to fact (Useem, 1995) , these types of expert opinion surveys are increasingly important tools within the social sciences. According to Castles and Mair (1984) , in situations where reliable and objective data are missing,`expert' opinion or judgment can act as substitutes.
(6) Pensions and Investments agreed to cosponsor the project, with the University of Oxford, and to write an article promoting the survey. In addition, the survey received support and assistance from the Centre for Pensions and Superannuation, the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, KPA Advisory Services, the Lupina Foundation (Toronto), the Pension Research Council, the Retirement Security Project, and the Transport Studies Fund at Oxford. (7) The results presented in this paper make up only a small portion of the data collected. For further details of these and numerous other findings, see Clark and Monk (2008) .
Nevertheless, the survey's reliability depends on the characteristics of the respondents; surveys of highly educated individuals will typically be more reliable than surveys of the mass public for a given domain (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Weber et al, 2002) . This implies that being an expert on a subject makes one's responses on this same subject more reliable (Huber and Inglehart, 1995) . So, as Dorn and Huberman (2005) suggest, experts' responses can be proxies for actual evidence when they are surveyed in the specific domain for which they are highly knowledgeable. By virtue of their education, profession, and experience, the pension`experts' surveyed here have this kind of special knowledge. This is sufficient enough that I may rely upon their opinion as a proxy for actual evidence. Moreover, by cross-checking the expert accounts and triangulating these findings with other qualitative and empirical findings, the results do convey rigor (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) .
Test 1
The first statement presented to the expert respondents goes to the heart of the issues under consideration in this paper:`plan governance is not well suited to the effective investment of DB assets because trustees are not selected for their investment competencies'. The expert respondents were given the option of marking`strongly agree', agree',`neutral',`disagree', and`strongly disagree'. This question serves to test Clark's (2007) `representation' versus`expertise' theory of why pension governance inadequately prepares boards for the financial tasks they face. As Clark argues, financial decision making under risk and uncertainty can be very costly if institutional governance is contrary to those imperatives. In effect, I am attempting to determine explicitly if these competing demands are at the heart of the pension governance problems with respect to effective investment policies.
Significantly, the experts, on the margin, agreed or strongly agreed with this claim (see figure 1) . The US average response showed roughly 43% agreeing and 38% disagreeing that the financial competency of trustees is compromised. Remarkably, while any pessimism amongst certain stakeholder groups would have highlighted governance limitations, on this issue a majority of US pension experts viewed the system as deficient. Clearly, the governance system failed test 1. Moreover, further mining of the data exposes fascinating differences of opinion amongst the various stakeholders. For example, public pension-fund trustees disagree at a rate of 61% that their governance system is compromised in terms of investment competencies while their money managers agree at a rate of 60%. Government regulators and academics share the view adopted by the money managers, viewing the governance system as deficient in this area. While some overconfidence by financial actors is to be expected (Barber and Odean, 1999) , the confident response rate by public pension-plan trustees is clearly out of step with the others. Interestingly, the private pension-plan trustees are much more sceptical about their governance system than their public counterparts. This begs the question:`why are the public trustees so defensive about their governance systems considering the cases highlighted in section 2?'
Test 2
Next, the respondents were probed on issues relating to the effect of outside influence on the allocation and investment of pension-fund assets. Close-dialogue discussions with DB stakeholders frequently raise the spectre of plan sponsor influence as a problem for pension-plan investment decision making. In particular, many in the public sector fear politicians using pension plans for politically targeted investments. As such, insulating the board's investment decision making is viewed as a crucial test.
In an attempt to go to the heart of the issue, the survey posed the following statement: asset allocation policy is difficult to determine in DB plans because of competing interest of trustees in benefit security and interest of plan sponsors in cost containment'. Clearly, sponsor's interests should not influence investment decisions at all, so any positive answers to the above question will raise alarms. On average, the US governance system passed this test, with 37% agreeing and 48% disagreeing (see figure 2) . However, the fact that 37% of respondents view pension Asset allocation policy is difficult to determine in defined benefit plans because of the competing trustees' interest in benefit security and the plan sponsor's interest in cost containment.
funds as vulnerable to outside influences is not encouraging. Moreover, by examining the data according to affiliations, we find more interesting stakeholder variations. Once again, academics, regulators, and money managers viewed the current governance model with clear suspicion, all giving it failing marks on this issue. Private trustees were internally divided about their abilities, with 1% more disagreeing than agreeing. And, once again, the public pension trustees were extremely confident in their governance, agreeing at a rate of 24% and disagreeing at a rate of 67%. In this instance, as in the previous instance, one must ask:`why are public pension trustees so confident, especially vis-a© -vis the other pension stakeholders, about their internal governance protocols?' They, like the private pension plans, have suffered major governance failures over the past two decades.
Test 3
Given that US pension governance systems are for the most part deficient in some way, according to the survey findings and others (Ambachtsheer, 2007b; Clark et al, 2006; , it was deemed important to determine whether plan sponsors would be held responsible for any future governance breakdowns. Indeed, as highlighted above, large unfunded pension liabilities can have devastating impacts on city and state finances, as extra contributions to make up for poor investment returns can consume much-needed resources. Given this, it was deemed important to determine whether DB pensions provide sponsors with some sort of contingency. For example, if a pension governance failure leads to a US$10 billion gap between the assets and liabilities in a pension plan, it is important to evaluate whether the sponsors are responsible for filling this gap alone, even if it might mean a significant cutback in publicly provided services or a large tax increase. On this issue, the respondents were first presented with a statement designed to evaluate whether the sponsors are even capable of planning for future governance breakdowns of the type highlighted above:`plan sponsors cannot take into consideration all unforeseen contingencies stemming from long-term DB risks'. The responses to this first statement were remarkable: the experts overwhelmingly agreed (70%) that sponsors are unable to plan for future contingencies (see figure 3) . Next, we presented the respondents with the following statement:`plan sponsors should not be held responsible for all unforeseen contingencies stemming from long-term DB risks'. Since the experts overwhelmingly acknowledged above that plan sponsors could not anticipate all future problems, expectations would be that the same experts would not hold plan sponsors responsible for these same unforeseeable problems. However, this was not the case. A significant population of experts (in particular, the regulators) held a view that simultaneously accepted that sponsors could not anticipate future problems but nonetheless held them responsible for these problems (compare figures 3 and 4). This is a pessimistic finding for the plan sponsors, particularly considering the findings from tests 1 and 2. Basically, many felt that, if pension governance fails, plan sponsors should be held responsible, come what may. This has serious implications for DB pension sustainability and the solvency of sponsors.
5 Governance case studies: past failures While stakeholder opinions vary, the above results from the global survey give a generic impression of a governance system struggling to meet the requirements of the modern financial and political landscape. Clearly, governance failures can lead to dramatic reallocations of capital, with consequences for the geography of finance. In addition, these failures can lead to increasing plan sponsor commitments, with knock-on effects for public finances. In order to further demonstrate how the above findings can translate into real-world experience, this section offers two case studies of past governance failures. The first case shows how outside influences corrupt pensionplan asset-allocation decisions. The second case shows how inadequate financial competencies of pension-fund trustees have led to dramatic changes in investment strategies. Indeed, both cases`give life' to the pessimistic survey findings by grounding in case analysis the importance of pension-plan governance. Figure 4 . Plan sponsors should not be held responsible for all unforeseen contingencies stemming from long-term defined benefit risks.
Political influence: the legacy of Colt Industries
According to the Clapman Report (Clapman, 2007) ,`T he best defence against those who would misuse the trust of others is to ensure the [pension] institution has transparent governance, where the individuals in charge are accountable to the beneficial owners through established procedures that strengthen the fiduciary relationship between trustee and the beneficiary'' (page 19). This ideal, which would remedy the problems uncovered in the expert survey, has unfortunately not always been matched by real-world experience. Indeed, long before the San Diego and New Jersey governance failures cited in section 2 was the case of Colt Industries.
On 1 February 1990 Connecticut State Treasurer Francisco Borges penned a letter to the Journal Inquirer in which he said:`I have not and will not invest even a penny of state pension money in any venture, unless and until I am utterly confident that such an investment meets the strictest possible guidelines of prudence and profitability.'' Clearly, Borges understood well the principles of pension-plan governance. Unfortunately, the mechanisms with which these principles were implemented were severely lacking. Only two months later, Borges subverted his statement by ordering the Connecticut pension plan to invest in a failing firm, Colt Industries, to preserve local jobs at a politically sensitive time (see Kaplan and Zelermyer, 1999) .
The Connecticut pension fund provided an initial bridge loan of US$25 million to Colt Industries, which was subsequently transferred into a direct investment equal to 47% of the firm's equity. Despite numerous claims about the financial merits of the Colt investment, political criteria were clearly at the heart of the investment decision (Kaplan and Zelermyer, 1999; Romano, 1993) , going against standard governance principles. In the end, the state pension fund only recovered US$4.3 million from its initial investment, thereby decreasing beneficiary welfare and making Colt Industries a prototypical pension-fund governance failure of the type examined in test 2 above. It demonstrated that pension-fund investment decisions could be subverted by outsiders for political and social goals.
More broadly, Colt`poisoned the well' for other pension plans considering similar local investments. After Colt, local pension investments were viewed with even more scepticism, since they were potentially vulnerable to political motivates. This politicization made investing locally more difficult to justify. While some welcomed the elimination of all local investments on the grounds that political criteria could not be separated from real investment potential, many potentially lucrative investments were undoubtedly passed over, with implications for beneficiary welfare and sponsor contributions. Indeed, local pension investments in firms and property can be extremely lucrative, so long as they are part of a diversified portfolio and are subject to rigorous governance principles designed to eliminate influence pandering.
For example, in 2003 and 2004 two New York pension plans (New York City Employees Retirement System and the New York City Teachers Retirement System) invested roughly US$71 million in two high-profile local real-estate deals. Many claimed that these real-estate investments were politically motivated, raising the spectre of a Colt Industries-type governance failure, since Manhattan real estate was facing serious difficulties in the post-9/11 economic environment. However, nothing could have been further from the truth. These pension-fund investments recently returned US$365 million, a fantastic performance under any conditions (Forsyth and Chittum, 2007) . As these public pension investments demonstrated, understanding the local economic geography can facilitate amazing returns, underscoring the potential economic value associated with investment familiarity.
Indeed, according to Huberman (2001) ,``familiarity, apparently a non-financial attribute, affects investors' choices'' (page 675). While investing in those things familiar may represent a suboptimal investment strategy based on traditional portfolio theory, being knowledgeable or familiar with a certain investment undoubtedly carries advantages. Indeed, for those willing to look beyond the efficient market hypothesis, familiarity, which creates specific situated knowledge, is the source of investment opportunities unobserved by the market. As a result, local investments represent clear opportunities for investment gain, so long as the pensions do not overinvest in their back yard (as has occurred in certain defined contribution plans). Indeed, in Coval and Moskowitz's (2001) study of the mutual fund industry, they found that managers generated substantially higher returns from local investments (within 100 kilometres of fund headquarters) by exploiting informational advantages associated with nearby stocks. Despite the clear benefits from investing locally, the Colt governance failure made these lucrative local investments more difficult. In sum, flows of pension capital into local investments were hampered by Colt, with important consequences for the management of assets and liabilities and for local urban geographies.
Financial competency: the legacy of the`perfect storm'
Funded pensions were originally set up for the purpose of increasing retirement security. These prefunded pension systems rely on market performance for the welfare of beneficiaries. As such, good pension-fund governance dictates that the trustees of the pension plan have appropriate levels of financial competence. Moreover, as argued above, an appropriate investment policy considers the assets and liabilities in every investment decision. However, once again, this ideal has not always translated into practice. In the 1990s, investment strategies at pension funds divorced asset and liability management policies.
Pension assets were growing at double-digit rates, and this growth left trustees preoccupied with the amazing gains from investment strategies that targeted rapid asset growth. In fact, many governments took funding holidays to free up pension contributions for other projects (Mason, 2003) . While this was comprehensible given the context of exploding asset values, it was also very precarious and wrought with governance breakdowns. Indeed, in 2001 a`perfect storm' of low asset returns and low interest rates combined to punish those plans that had ignored their liabilities, sparking a massive downturn in pension funding levels (see Langley, 2004) . Even DB pensions considered healthy were suddenly faced with severe underfunding; the sponsors were then forced to contribute much more than they had anticipated, with devastating consequences.
This pension funding crisis was a clear governance failure. Trustees were not fully aware of the financial risks associated with their investment strategies. By focusing on maximizing asset returns rather than on securing liabilities, they failed their primary responsibility of ensuring pensioner security. Certainly, actuarial and accounting shortcomings were complicit, but the investment policies themselves were seriously flawed. Indeed, as test 1 in the survey above demonstrated, the competencies of the pension-fund trustees were compromised by the governance system itself, which puts a premium on`representation' to the detriment of financial`expertise'.
In terms of geography, this governance failure had important implications. To be sure, plan sponsor contributions increased, due to the growing unfunded liabilities, leaving public entities with strained budgets. Moreover, this failure changed the flow of pension capital throughout financial markets, as pensions sought to better match their assets with their liabilities. Indeed, asset-liability management strategies became the norm after the bubble burst, as trustees looked to immunize their plans from the heretofore underappreciated financial risks. However, given that pension liabilities are not reliably quantifiable, not legally tradeable, not cheaply retireable, and not easily transferable, it proved extremely difficult to create a portfolio that perfectly matched the assets to the liabilities (Clark and Monk, 2007a) . Standard pricing models cannot be used for valuing the pension liability. As such, creating a portfolio that accurately reflects the pension liabilities requires a high level of financial literacy. So, while the bursting asset bubble exposed the inadequacies of the governance system, the proffered solutionöhighly complex investment strategies ömagnified these same inadequacies.
As it stands today, two types of pension asset reallocations have occurred as a result of the`perfect-storm' governance failure: one group has moved into easy-tomanage riskless financial securities that approximate the liability, and another group has moved into highly risky alternative assets that can match the liabilities very well, such as investments in infrastructure (see Torrance, 2007) . In all cases, pension funds have steadily reduced their equity exposure over the past few years. For example, US$135 billion have come out of domestic equity products since 2005 alone (Bruno, 2007) . According to Karmin (2007a) , large public pension plans have been selling billions in US equities, and this trend is set to continue as these institutions move out of public equities and into other investment classes, such as hedge funds, private equity, or real estate. Indeed, some are shifting these assets into bonds and others into alternative assets; in both cases the`flows' of pension finance have been noticeably altered.
5.2.1`All bonds'
For those boards that recognized their inability to implement the complex investment portfolios put forth as`the solution', investing in long-dated government bonds was viewed as a good compromise. The life of a government bond approximates the life cycle of a pension liability, albeit crudely, and is thus perceived to be an adequate match for the liability. As such, some plans began shifting assets out of equities into bonds. However, despite some high-profile cases of pensions moving out of equities and into bonds, (8) scepticism remained that pension boards would be willing to give up the potential returns associated with the riskier securities to lock in their liabilities through bonds.
As such, the pension experts were presented with the following statement as part of the global survey:`mature DB schemes should largely be invested in bonds or otherwise immunized to the maximum extent possible'. Given that pension plans were moving out of equities, we wanted to determine if the global experts anticipated this money flowing into bonds or alternative assets. This is a very important differentiation, as a choice for bonds would put considerable amounts of pension capital back in the hands of the government and a choice for alternative assets would put pension capital to work in the private sector. The results in the US context showed that media attention on the`all-bonds' strategy was unwarranted. Rather, US experts put their faith in alternative assets, largely rejecting the`all-bonds' strategy in the findings (figure 5).
Alternative assets
Consequently, pension funds will be, and have been, making a significant shift into alternative assets as part of their evolving asset-liability management strategies. For example, the Teacher Retirement System of Texas is shifting roughly one third of its US$112 billion into alternative investments, with significant portions going to hedge funds (Karmin, 2007b ). The California Public Employees' Retirement System recently decided to increase its allocation to hedge funds (a specific type of alternative asset) (8) The most famous of these instances occurred in the private sector when the Boots pension moved entirely into bonds in 2001, selling off their entire equity portfolio.
to US$12 billion alone; this is up from US$50 million five years ago (Tse, 2007) . Today, pension funds are the largest investor group in alternative asset classes (Watson Wyatt, 2006) . However, while the empirical and survey data above show that trustees prefer alternative assets to bonds in their quest to match assets with liabilities, the survey findings also suggest that pensions do not have the governance systems in place to manage the high risks associated with alternative assets. This point is confirmed elsewhere: a recent report by State Street (2007) on institutional investors' experience demonstrated that governance remained a crucial concern for those pension funds investing in hedge funds. Given that 44% of the funds in the State Street survey had more than 10% of their assets already in hedge funds, it is indeed worrying to learn that 48% of these same funds admit that their risk-management tools and analysis could be more robust. Moreover, 22% of the institutions indicated that their governing body simply did not understand alternative assets well enough. These are worrying findings, as implementing these alternative asset strategies requires a large`governance budget' and high levels of financial competence (Clark and Urwin, 2008) .
Another governance failure associated with financial competency, in this instance in the domain of alternative assets, would have equally significant implications as the first perfect-storm governance failure on the flow of pension capital and the burden of pension-fund liabilities. Indeed, if a hedge fund collapsed, exposing a pension plan to a large financial loss in their alternative assets portfolio, one would expect trustees to withdraw these`alternative' mandates and redirect this money back into bonds until such a time as they could demonstrate that governance mechanisms could ensure pensioner welfare within the riskier asset classes. This has in fact occurred recently, as certain plans have grown uncomfortable with their abilities to manage the risks associated with hedge funds in the current volatile markets and are now in the process of rethinking their mandates (Karmin, 2007a U S a v e r a g e P u b l i c t r u s t e e C o r p o r a t e t r u s t e e M o n e y m a n a g e r G o v e r n m e n t r e g u l a t o r A c a d e m i c Figure 5 . Mature defined benefit schemes should largely be invested in bonds or otherwise immunized to the maximum extent possible.
understood the risks, this does not appear to be a problem. (9) Indeed, some plans' appetite for hedge funds may in fact be increasing (see Strauss, 2007; Williamson, 2008) , as plans seek assets that do not move with public equities or bonds. One hopes that the latter pension funds have governance systems up to the task of managing higher levels of alternative assets.
Conclusion
The current pension-fund governance model is inadequate at managing the increasingly complex investment strategies associated with modern financial portfolios and, additionally, it fails to fully insulate itself from outside influencesöthis according to a survey of over 1250 US pension experts. These findings corroborate the pessimistic views held by others about pension-fund governance. As Ambachtsheer (2007b) said,`t he challenge for many pension funds around the world continues to be to raise their governance game from bad to better, and that bad governance practices have an economic cost'' (page 3). While this is undoubtedly true, I make an additional claim: bad governance, in addition to having an economic cost, has important geographic consequences. Indeed, how pensions are governed today affects what investments are available, and what investments are available has knock-on effects for plan sponsors' budgets.
First, the perfect-storm breakdown demonstrated that investment decision making requires high levels of financial competency. Without this, significant financial losses can occur and tend to come with burdensome sponsor contributions and drastic changes in investment policies. Next, the Colt Industries breakdown demonstrated how outside influences can have nefarious consequences for beneficiary welfare and make local (lucrative) investments more difficult. Considering the state of public finances at the moment, increasing pension costs stemming from poor governance are inopportune, as states' preexisting financial demands have been growing more rapidly than their revenues. This further raises the stakes for implementing`good governance' systems. In addition, the recent market turmoil has further reinforced the importance of well-governed financial institution. As Trickett (2007) argues,`D ifficult economic times oblige long-term investors, such as pension funds, to think carefully about whether they make changes to their asset strategies or simplỳ hold on' through the turbulence ... the extent to which they are successful depends on their governance'' (page 6). But what does a good governance system look like? Good governance views the decision-making process as reducible to a series of best practices that join accountability and transparency with checks and balances in a decision-making environment that promotes dynamism and flexibility. As Clark (2007) suggests, good pension governance also implies structured deliberation, integration of short-term investment strategies into long-term objectives, revaluation of the performance of these strategies, and adaptation of these strategies to the ever-changing financial environment. Indeed, the most important test of a governance system is its relationship with innovation.
Is all this too much to ask of pension-plan trustees? Given that these institutions are inherited, breaking out of the path dependence and achieving a dramatic change in governance systems will be difficult. Moreover, given that public pension trustees (9) The collapse of Sowood Capital Management created a US$30 million loss for Massachusetts PRIM. Nevertheless, due to the rigorous governance procedures in place at Massachusetts PRIM, which is well known for its investment procedures (see Hagerman et al, 2006) , this specific case has not sparked a reallocation of assets. Indeed, according to Executive Director Travaglini in the Boston Globe (3 August 2007):``We're not troubled by Sowood because it's part of a disciplined diversified program.'' remain confident in the status quo, a view that is contradicted by numerous other pension stakeholders, changes in the public sphere may be slow in coming. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this paper suggest it is necessary, and the increasing stakes, which are inextricably linked with the rising asset and liability values, suggest that an investment in governance is well worth it. As Clark and Urwin (2008) argue,`c omplacency is the enemy of long-term value creation'' (page 13) and``governance is an investment not just a cost'' (page 19).
